Trends

Conditions with the most meaningful increases in the number of notifications compared with previous years
• Salmonella infections: 2564 cases, the highest annual count to date. 1 This increase is mainly due to a large point-source outbreak affecting 319 people who ate Vietnamese-style pork or chicken rolls from a bakery.
• Infectious syphilis, primarily affecting homosexual men residing in metropolitan Sydney.
• Mumps: 323 cases, a steady increase from 28 cases in 2001. This increase occurred mainly in the second half of the year in young adults in South East Sydney Illawarra (Randwick region) AHS.
• 
Conditions least frequently reported
There were no reported cases of anthrax, avian influenza, botulism, chancroid, diphtheria, granuloma inguinale, lyssavirus, plague, polio, rabies, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), smallpox, tularaemia, typhus, viral haemorrhagic fever or yellow fever in NSW in 2007.
Top five notifiable diseases
Rates for the most commonly reported notifiable diseases for each age group and geographical area of residence at the time of notification are presented in Fig. 1 and Table 1 . These lists indicate the relative importance of notifiable diseases only and should not be used to indicate the spread of all infectious diseases in NSW. It should also be noted that these rates are heavily influenced by testing practices and, in many instances, do not necessarily indicate the true or relative incidence in the community. Finally, these lists do not include the institutional gastrointestinal outbreaks as comprehensive demographic data are not collected for such outbreaks.
Geographical distribution of notifiable diseases
• Chlamydia trachomatis infection was the most commonly reported infection across NSW with highest rates observed in regional areas followed by rural and metropolitan areas.
• Rates of hepatitis C infection were comparable across rural, regional and metropolitan areas. Most of these cases will represent chronic infection rather than acute hepatitis C acquisition and as such may not accurately reflect the recent spread of the hepatitis C epidemic.
• Arboviral infections are more commonly reported in people residing in rural and regional areas than in metropolitan areas, relating to the distribution of infected mosquitoes. • Higher rates of disease are reported for Justice Health compared with the rest of NSW, likely related to higher testing rates for bloodborne viruses and sexually transmitted infections on entry into correctional facilities. Within this population, hepatitis C was the most commonly reported infection, attributable to high rates of injecting drug use.
Age distribution of notifiable diseases
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• Chlamydia trachomatis infections account for the most notifications in adults with rates peaking at 818 per 100 000 in people aged between 16 and 24 years.
• Influenza is the most commonly reported notifiable disease in adults aged 65 years and older though this rate is markedly lower than that observed in children aged less than five years of age. Children and older adults are more likely to undergo testing for influenza.
Outbreaks and threats
Several notable disease outbreaks and threats were reported in 2007 in NSW. These included:
Conclusions
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The increase in Salmonella infections serves as a timely reminder to all to ensure thorough cooking and safe handling of high-risk foods such as raw chicken and other meats, and undercooked, cracked or soiled eggs, while the Legionnaire disease outbreak highlights the importance of cooling tower maintenance.
We thank all those general and specialist medical practices, laboratories, hospitals, schools, child-care centres and others who have notified diseases of public health significance to their local public health units for investigation and control.
Background
In February 2002, the 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (7vPCV) (Prevenar; Wyeth, Sydney) was provided free in NSW for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander infants and others at high risk of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) at two, four and six months of age. 1 This was a response to higher rates of IPD in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children compared with the total child population. 2 (For ease of reporting, henceforth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander will be referred to as Aboriginal.)
Based on Australian Bureau of Statistics population statistics, it was estimated that 1200 doses of the vaccination would be required for approximately 400 Aboriginal babies born each year within Western Sydney and Wentworth Area Health Services. However, twelve months after 7vPCV was introduced to the schedule, only 406 vaccine doses had been ordered.
Intervention to improve uptake of 7vPCV
A steering group was convened to identify ways to improve the uptake of 7vPCV among Aboriginal infants in Coverage rates for vaccines recommended for all children were higher than the state average for Aboriginal children (93% fully vaccinated in Sydney West v. 87% in NSW) and also for non-Aboriginal children (91% v. 90%, respectively). 3 The steering group decided that the main reasons for low coverage of 7vPCV in Aboriginal children were likely to be a lack of knowledge about the targeted program among both parents and providers, and failure in identifying eligible infants. An intervention was designed to facilitate the identification of the Indigenous status of babies in maternity hospitals and general practice (GP), and to provide parents of Aboriginal infants with relevant educational materials. These aims were implemented through six actions:
• maximising the identification of Aboriginal infants by ward staff at the three local maternity hospitals • training sessions for all maternity hospital staff, Aboriginal Liaison Officers (ALOs), community health centres and council vaccination staff in the two area health services • posters and information sheets were mailed to all local immunisation providers • personal contact between parents and ALOs • provision of information to parents by ALOs • placement of an 'eligible for free 7vPCV' sticker in the babies' Child Health Records (Blue Books) by maternity ward staff.
The sticker was intended to act as a prompt for providers when the child attended hospital for other vaccinations or reasons. An information session was also held at the local GP division meeting, but only a small proportion of GPs attended.
The intervention was fully operational by the last quarter of 2003 and continued until the 7vPCV vaccination was funded for all Australian infants in January 2005.
Evaluation methods
An evaluation was conducted 12 months after the commencement of the intervention to assess:
• its impact on identifying Aboriginal babies at maternity hospitals
Interviews
Structured telephone or face-to-face interviews were carried out with all ward-based maternity staff members responsible for placing stickers, ALOs at the two largest hospitals in the area and AMS nursing staff. Structured telephone interviews were also sought from all GPs in the two area health service areas who had ordered 7vPCV during the intervention period.
Nursing staff at Daruk AMS took part in structured interviews. In addition, during a six-week data collection period during May and June 2004, the Child Health Records of all Aboriginal babies born after the commencement of the intervention were checked for the presence of information on 7vPCV and the sticker. 
Australian Childhood Immunisation Register data analysis
Evaluation results
Interviews
During the intervention, hospital admission departments, previously advised by maternity ward staff and social workers, provided ALOs with the names of Aboriginal babies.
Interviews of staff at maternity hospitals revealed several barriers to identifying babies as Aboriginal; these barriers continued after staff training had taken place. Key barriers were:
• the reliance on software that recorded the Aboriginal status of mothers, but not of fathers
• identifying babies discharged after hours, on weekends or after only a short stay; babies of nonresident mothers (such as babies admitted to neonatal intensive care) • the difficulty of maintaining staff awareness in this urban setting where few Aboriginal babies were seen • the difficulty of maintaining staff awareness among new or relief staff.
Daruk AMS staff reported that their clients were very aware of the 7vPCV vaccine and the need for their babies to receive it.
The extent to which the program was responsible for improving knowledge was uncertain; however, the nursing staff felt it played a substantial role. Nurses also reported that there was now a greater community awareness of the vaccine and that the hospital-based information was supporting this knowledge.
Thirteen babies born after November 2003 were seen during the six weeks that data were collected. Six babies (46%) had the sticker in their Child Health Record, and one had the information postcard in the sleeve of the Child Health Record. Nurses estimated that approximately 60% of all babies who were eligible to receive the 7vPCV vaccination had the sticker in their Child Health Record.
General practice
During the first eight months of the program, 27 of approxi mately 700 GPs in Western Sydney and Wentworth Area Health Services ordered 7vPCV for an Aboriginal infant born after the intervention commenced. Twenty-three GPs were interviewed; these GPs had vaccinated 29 Aboriginal babies. At GP consultations, Child Health Records were brought for 24 of the babies (83%), seven Child Health Records had a sticker (29%) and, in four consultations (14%), the sticker had contributed to the identification and vaccination of the baby. Table 1 presents the results of data on service provider types that reported 7vPCV vaccinations to the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) during the evaluation period. The largest proportion of babies was vaccinated by GPs (45%), followed by the AMS (33%). 
Targeted immunisation program
Australian Childhood Immunisation Register data analysis
Discussion
This evaluation has found a moderate impact from an intervention designed to improve the uptake of 7vPCV vaccination of Aboriginal infants in an urban setting.
Results suggested a high level of awareness among AMS clients, but only 4% of GPs in the area were known to have vaccinated an Aboriginal infant in the first eight months of the intervention. On follow up, the increased identification of Aboriginal babies and the placement of stickers in Child Health Records were successful for approximately half of Aboriginal infants who attended the AMS.
The methods used in both the intervention and the evaluation were limited by the resources available but were regarded as appropriate. 4 Community consultation was limited to the inclusion of the local AMS; only health care workers were interviewed and the evaluation did not include a pre-intervention phase or, with the exception of ACIR coverage data, a comparison group in a non-intervention area. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with previous findings of low uptake of vaccination programs targeted at Aboriginal people, lower vaccination coverage in Aboriginal people in urban areas, low rates of identification of Aboriginal people in NSW hospitals and the considerable difficulties associated with overcoming these issues. [5] [6] [7] Identification of Indigenous status is fundamental to understanding and addressing equity of access to health care services for Aboriginal people. It is a key objective of both the NSW Aboriginal Health Strategic Plan and the guidelines to improve identification of Indigenous status in the public hospital system. 8, 9 However, to improve Aboriginal identification and maximise the effectiveness of targeted programs in influencing change, there are system-level barriers that need to be addressed. The implementation of any program targeting Aboriginal people will need to acknowledge and consider the barriers identified in this evaluation.
While the AMS is the largest single provider of immunisation services for Aboriginal babies, this evaluation has shown that for these infants in an urban setting, most will be immunised by a non-Aboriginal provider. Any program in a similar urban setting that targets either Aboriginal immunisation service provision or the needs of immunisation providers should consider the significant role of nonAboriginal providers. However, most GPs do not immunise Aboriginal babies, and those that do will only immunise small numbers in individual practices. These results have implications for the delivery and use of scarce resources for these immunisation programs in general practice. Future directed programs would need to consider whether (and to whom, and how) to direct resources preferentially. To address this problem it would be helpful to explore the role of divisions of general practice; possible registers of GPs with an interest in Aboriginal health; and the development of formal links between GPs, divisions of general practice and the AMS. More community-based research involving Aboriginal people may uncover other useful strategies.
Conclusion
An intervention developed at the local level has been partially successful in improving the impact of vaccination targeted at Aboriginal children in an urban setting. However, significant structural bar riers need to be addressed before equity of access is achieved. These include complete recording of Indigenous status in hospitals and increased awareness in general practice.
Background
Invasive Meningococcal Disease (IMD) is a serious but uncommon bacterial infection. The disease usually presents as meningitis or septicaemia, or a combination of the two presentations, with a case fatality rate of approximately 10% despite appropriate antibiotic therapy. 1 Disease rates are higher among some population groups, such as African-Americans. 3 These higher disease rates have been attributed to other risk factors such as poverty and overcrowding, while higher mortality rates have been linked to limited access to health care services. 3, 4 Living conditions, such as overcrowding, can result in a higher exposure to potential carriers of Neisseria meningitidis. 4 There are little published data describing the risk of IMD among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. A north Queensland study found a 3-fold greater risk for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples for the period 1995 to 1999. 5 The incidence of IMD in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Western Australia was six times greater than that of the non-Aboriginal population for the period 1990-1995. 6 The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reported notification rates between 7. The aims of the study were to assess the completeness of data describing Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status in NSW invasive meningococcal disease data contained within the NSW Notifiable Diseases Database; and to describe the relative risk for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples being notified with IMD in NSW compared with the non-Aboriginal population.
Methods
Data on meningococcal disease is collected in NSW under the requirements of the Public Health Act (1991) , with all cases of meningococcal disease meeting the case definitions of the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System being notifiable by pathology laboratories, hospitals and doctors to public health units. 9 Case information is entered into the NSW Notifiable Diseases Database. Five-year mean notification rates were calculated for comparison purposes. The risk of being notified with meningococcal disease in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population was calculated and then compared with the risk for the non-Aboriginal population (relative risk). Age standardisation was performed using the direct method to control for the higher proportion of younger people in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population. The non-Aboriginal population in NSW was used as the standard. For ease of reference in reporting, 'Aboriginal' will be used to refer to both groups combined.
Controlling for socioeconomic status was not feasible with the notification data available. There is no routine collection of a notified individual's socioeconomic status, and the small numbers of notifications would not support an ecological analysis.
Results
During the period under study, there were 2628 notifications of invasive meningococcal disease in NSW residents. Of these notifications 139 were recorded as Aboriginal people (Table 1 (Table 2 ).
IMD notification rates in non-Aboriginal people over the three study periods ranged from 2.11-3.17 per 100 000 population, while for Aboriginal people the rates ranged from 6.02-7.90 per 100 000 population. There was a statistically significant two-to three-fold increased risk of IMD across the three study periods for Aboriginal people in NSW ( Table 2 ).
The highest notification rates for IMD in NSW during the period under review were seen in young children. In the period 2001-2005, non-Aboriginal children aged 0-4 years experienced an IMD rate of 12.37 per 100 000 population, while the rate was 40.99 per 100 000 population among Aboriginal children in this age group. After direct (Table 3) .
Discussion
The recording of Aboriginal status in NSW has improved since 1990, with invalid data decreasing from 42% to 8%. This improvement in recording of status justifies the comparison of risk among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in NSW.
The risk of IMD is not homogenous across the population of NSW. Our analysis confirms that young children are at increased risk, but importantly indicates that Aboriginal status is also associated with higher rates of disease. Other countries also have demonstrated heterogenous risk among different portions of their population. In the United Kingdom, IMD incidence and mortality are socially patterned, with IMD incidence in the most deprived quintile being twice that of the most affluent quintile. 10 In New Zealand, significantly higher rates of IMD have been reported in Maori (relative risk = 2.2) and Pacific Islander people (relative risk = 3.8) when compared with the European population. 11 Aboriginal people are the most disadvantaged group in Australia. 12 Two important risk factors associated with increased risk of IMD are more common among Aboriginal people, namely having a smoker among close contacts, including maternal smoking, and sharing a bedroom. [13] [14] [15] It is not possible to explore the causal interaction of these factors from notifiable disease data. Further research into these factors could lead to the development of more informed prevention strategies.
The early recognition and diagnosis of meningococcal infection can lead to reduced risk of complications. 16 In addition to clinicians being aware of a higher risk of IMD in young children, this analysis indicates an even higher risk in young Aboriginal children.
Conclusions
The completeness of the data on Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status in notifications of invasive meningococcal disease in NSW has improved sufficiently to warrant inclusion in the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare's Performance Indicators report. This will further the understanding of meningococcal disease across Australia.
In NSW, Aboriginal children 0-4 years of age have a significantly higher risk of invasive meningococcal disease when compared with non-Aboriginal children. Two deaths have been caused by Australian Bat Lyssavirus (ABLV) infection in Australia. The clinical disease was a progressive encephalitis indistinguishable from rabies. ABLV is phylogenetically closely related to rabies virus, lyssavirus 1. Since ABLV was recognised, all state and territory health departments in Australia have adopted proto cols to administer post-exposure treatment (PET) to people bitten or scratched by bats, but there are jurisdictional differences. As it is a decade since the first human case was diagnosed, it is timely to review the NSW protocol against current practice in other jurisdictions, contemporary epidemiological understanding of ABLV, and the evidence for effectiveness of post-exposure treatment.
ABLV in Australia
Australian Bat Lyssavirus, genotype 7 of the lyssavirus genus, is a member of the family Rhabdoviridae that shares many serotypic, antigenic and molecular sequence Australia has five flying foxes in the genus Pteropus. They eat fruit and live in large colonies, often with multiple species roosting together. Australia also has a diversity of small insectivorous microbats, with approximately 80 species recorded. In NSW, the grey headed flying fox (P. poliocephalus) inhabits predominantly coastal and mountainous regions; the black flying fox (P. alecto) is found mainly in the northern coastal area; and the little red flying fox (P. scapulatus) has a range that extends further west, encompassing most of the state. 5 The microbat, S. flaviventris, is distributed throughout Australia, except South Australia and the southern parts of Western Australia.
Prevalence in Queensland and NSW
To allow for an assessment of the risk, it is necessary to establish the prevalence of ABLV among flying foxes and microbats. Prevalence data from bats submitted through an arrangement of Queensland public health units with Queensland Scientific Services during July 1998 to February 2006, and from bats submitted through an arrangement of NSW public health units with Australian Animal Health Laboratories between 1995 and 2005 are presented in Table 1 .
It is important to note that the four microbats from NSW that tested positive for ABLV were all detected in the first quarter of 1999, but were not identified to the species level. These are similar findings to a large screening program conducted in partnership with Department of Primary Industries in Queensland from June 1996 to March 2002. 6 Among submitted ill or injured animals, 69/974 (7.1%) of flying foxes and 5/158 (3.2%) of microbats were ABLV positive using direct fluorescent antibody testing (DFAT).
All five positive microbats were S. flaviventris, and these were five of the seven S. flaviventris specimens tested. In another large survey of caught wild bats, none of 475 wildcaught flying foxes were DFAT positive. 7 Eight of 266 (3%) wild-caught flying foxes were antibody positive. Of 318 wild-caught microbats, none were DFAT positive while 9 (2.8%) were antibody positive.
The only microbat found to be DFAT positive, the yellow bellied sheath tail (S. flaviventris), is secretive and rarely seen by humans, and appears to have a high prevalence of infection. It has its own sub-strain ofABLV virus, which was responsible for a death in a bat handler. Four other species of small bats have been found to have antibodies to ABLV.
There is uncertainty about whether these species can transmit infection. The antibodies may represent seroconversion without infectivity or response to an insect rhabdovirus.
Exposures in Queensland
In a series of bat exposures reported in Brisbane, those exposed to bat bites were largely members of the public who approached a bat (55%) and professional or volunteer bat handlers (20%). 8 In 15% of cases, the bat initiated contact. Over the last 10 years, the Brisbane Southside Public Health Unit has administered over 300 courses of PET. Comparable figures for NSW are not collated.
Laboratory testing of bats
Queensland Health uses the Queensland Scientific Services laboratory in Brisbane for testing the brains of submitted bats for ABLV. All other states use the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong. Both laboratories use a DFAT on brain impression smears and also perform confirmatory polymerase chain reaction tests on all specimens. Complete concordance has been documented between these tests. 9 International experts state that either test alone is considered adequate for confirmation of rabies infection. 10, 11 The Australian Animal Health Laboratory also performs a DFAT on salivary gland tissue. Extensive experience with lyssavirus 1 has indicated that PET is unnecessary if the test results in the bat are negative (C Rupprecht, pers comm).
Effectiveness of post-exposure treatment
Of the 53 positive bats submitted by public health units (Table 1) , it is not known how many bit more than one person. However, it would be safe to estimate that the number of people exposed to known positive bats is between 50 and 100. Experience with rabies in countries where vaccine is not available shows that not everyone bitten by a rabid dog develops disease, so infection is unlikely to be universal in humans following a bite by a positive bat. 12 Cross protection offered by rabies vaccine against ABLV is supported by two published papers. Tests conducted at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, in mice vaccinated with four different rabies vaccines, found that all five mice challenged with ABLV survived. These tests did not include the vaccine currently used in Australia; however, they provided the basis for the current PET recommendation in Australia. 1 A second study published in 2005, examined cross protection against both ABLV and European Bat Lyssavirus. It demonstrated protection in only 15 of 19 mice challenged with ABLV. 13 Cross neutralisation with antibodies from 52 volunteers immunised with the human diploid cell vaccine (HDCV, as used in Australia) against various lyssaviruses, including ABLV, showed similar levels of neutralisation against all viruses, especially in low and mid level responders. As the vaccine was not fully protective in mice, and there are considerable interspecies differences in the virulence of the various lyssavrius genotypes, this is not convincing evidence of the vaccine's efficacy against ABLV in humans. Nevertheless, there has not been a failure of properly administered PET for rabies in the United States of America since 1979. 10 It is reassuring that there is no evidence of development of encephalitis documented among individuals administered PET. However, this does not guarantee 100% efficacy in preventing ABLV given the occasional prolonged incubation period of lyssavirus infection and the current incomplete documentation of administration and follow up of individuals initiated on PET.
In locations where treatment was withheld due to bats
Bat Lyssavirus post-exposure treatment 8 Updating this data in 2005 provided an additional 59 people exposed to bat bites or scratches, of whom 26 had the bat tested (all were negative) and 24 were not administered PET (Jarvinin, pers comm.).
Australian post-exposure treatment protocols
In Australia, a variety of protocols are available to guide PET following a bat exposure. These include the National Guidelines, the 8th edition of the Immunisation Handbook and various state and territory notifiable disease guidelines. 14, 15 Only South Australia and Tasmania do not have their own guidelines and defer exclusively to the National Guidelines for PET. Protocols share many features, for example: similar approaches to all bat exposures whether flying foxes or microbats; emphasis on the importance of immediate rigorous wound cleaning; using the same doses and schedules for immunoglobulin (HRIG) and rabies HDCV; and omitting HRIG where more than 7 days has elapsed since the first vaccine dose.
All protocols emphasise the necessity of testing the bat for ABLV. However, protocols differ notably in two aspects: the influence of bat brain testing for ABLV on PET and the influence of exposure type on PET. The Queensland, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory protocols explicitly state that PET should be withheld or ceased if the implicated bat's brain tests negative for ABLV. The Victorian protocol and NHMRC Immunisation Handbook also indirectly advocate this approach. The National Guideline defers this decision to local public health units. However, the former NSW protocol explicitly and uniquely stated that PET is not affected by the results of tests on the bat.
Protocols in NSW, Australian Capital Territory and
Victoria distinguish between severe and mild exposures. Severe bites are: bites on the face or neck; bites by a sick or abnormally behaving bat; or unprovoked or multiple bites. These states advocate immediate initiation of PET for a severe bite, but a delay of up to 48 h for other exposures. Another inconsistency is HRIG administration. Queensland and Victoria recommend excluding HRIG if the bite occurred more than 12 months previously, while the NHMRC Immunisation Handbook suggests administration in this circumstance. Other protocols are silent on this issue.
Discussion
ABLV has never been found in a bat caught during wildlife surveys, but has been present in the brains of approximately 6% of bats with human contact. Although wildlife surveys suggest that the risk from small bats is less than from large bats, there is sufficient uncertainty that the recommendation to regard all bats as infective should remain.
Laboratory tests on the brain of the bat, when available, can reliably detect the presence of Lyssavirus as supported by the concordance of different tests. Evidence from Queensland and the USA suggests that where a bat brain tests negative, it is not necessary to administer PET. There was no disease in the 89 people not given PET following the Queensland protocol, and similar positive experience with the same testing and management protocol following animal bites for thousands of people each year in the USA. 10 Evidence to support rabies protocols distinguishing severe and mild bites comes from reports of PET failures after dog bites in Thailand, in which a common feature was bites to the head or neck. 16, 17 PET failure is more likely after multiple dog bites, and the incubation time is shorter for bites closer to the brain, supporting the suggestion for PET to be initiated more promptly after such bites. There is a relative paucity of evidence from animal studies on the effectiveness of rabies vaccine against ABLV as the research was conducted only in small numbers of mice; however, further work in this area is currently underway.
Unfortunately there is currently no aggregation of data on the number or completion of PET courses in NSW, although vaccine supply data suggests up to 130 per year.
The current NSW guideline requests testing of all bats. Although this could lead to under-reporting of bites by carers who do not want the animal destroyed, the use of bat testing to guide PET decisions will result in some savings through reduced PET administration.
Conclusion
The lack of adverse outcomes in Queensland and the USA supports withholding PET following bat exposures in nonsevere bites if the bat tests negative. There is no direct evidence of the acceptable length of delay while waiting for a laboratory result, however 48 hours seems reasonable. Bats should be submitted without delay for ABLV testing directly to AAHL or QSS. For any bite PET may be suspended on the basis of a negative laboratory bat test.
It would be sensible to collate bat exposure and PET experience across NSW and Australia, including matching the bat results to the public health unit patient record. Public education on avoiding bat contact, and what to do if it occurs, remains the mainstay of preventing human ABLV infection. For a map of the distribution of big bats in Australia, see http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg 16021635.200-bats-out-of-hell.htm. 18 There are many risks associated with the use of recreational water, including exposure to infectious diseases. Infectious diseases are transmitted either through contact with skin or mucous membranes, inhalation or ingestion. The infectious organisms include bacteria, viruses and parasitic protozoa, which occur naturally in recreational water or water that has been contaminated. Sources for contamination include: sewage effluent, livestock, domestic animals, wildlife, population using the water (bather shedding), industrial processes and farming activities.
Recreational water and infectious diseases
A wide variety of infectious diseases can be transmitted through the use of recreational water including gastrointestinal disease, respiratory disease, ear infections, skin disease, liver or renal disease, central nervous system infections and keratitis. An association between contaminated water and gastrointestinal disease as well as respiratory disease has been shown in randomised controlled trials conducted in the United Kingdom. 1, 2 A prospective cohort study conducted in Sydney from 1989 to 1990 found that swimmers at Sydney ocean beaches were more likely to report respiratory, ear and eye symptoms than beach-goers who did not swim. 3 Since then, the water quality in Sydney has improved due to the commissioning of the deep-water ocean outfalls in the early 1990s. A multi-centre study is now being planned to assess the current water quality and help verify whether current guidelines are applicable to the Australian environment. The Beachwatch program guidelines are currently based on the Australian guidelines for recreational use of water. 4 A swimming site passes the guidelines if, for five samples collected in one month, the median does not exceed 150 cfu/100 mL thermotolerant coliforms and 35 cfu/100 mL enterococci, and the second highest value is below 600 cfu/100 mL thermotolerant coliforms and 100 cfu/100 mL enterococci.
Beachwatch programs
Providing the community with regular and reliable information on beach water quality is a priority. Beachwatch issues a daily advisory warning, weekly star ratings, monthly media releases and annual State of the Beaches reports, and provides data on the SoEdirect website (http://www.soedirect.nsw.gov.au).
Information collected by Beachwatch is also used by Sydney Water to prioritise short-and long-term sewerage system maintenance works.
Blue-green algae and its potential health effects
Blue-green algae (BGA) are photosynthetic bacteria that are a natural part of the aquatic environment. They occur in low numbers in even the most pristine quality waters. When there is an excess of nutrients in the water, BGA can form a prolific dense growth or bloom. These blooms mainly occur in freshwater and can pose a public health risk.
Some BGA can produce highly potent toxins. However, not all BGA produce toxins and the same species can be toxic as well as non-toxic depending on the environment, physiology and genetics. The main toxins produced by BGA are hepatotoxins, which damage the liver and other internal organs, or neurotoxins, which can cause paralysis and respiratory arrest. Possible long-term effects include hepatocellular carcinoma.
BGA also produce endotoxins, which are contact irritants. They are generally only a nuisance and can affect around 15% of healthy people coming into contact with them. Symptoms include dermatitis, conjunctivitis, stomach cramps, nausea, fever, headaches and flu-like symptoms.
In Australia, several species can be hepatotoxic, including Microcystis aeruginosa, Microcystis flos-aquae, Cylindro spermopsis racaborski and Nodularia spumigena. Anabaena circinalis is the main neurotoxin producer in Australia.
A few epidemiological studies conducted in Australia have shown contact irritation following exposure to BGA. [5] [6] [7] [8] 10.1071/NB08006
BUG BREAKFAST IN THE BULLETIN
Management of BGA occurs on several levels and varies from reducing nutrients entering the water body, placement of warning signs and BGA cell removal in water filtration plants.
What is anthrax?
Anthrax is a bacterial disease caused by infection with Bacillus anthracis. The same bacteria can lead to three forms of the disease:
• cutaneous anthrax • intestinal anthrax • inhalational (or pulmonary) anthrax.
Anthrax occurs among grazing animals in many parts of the world, including livestock in parts of western NSW. Anthrax is a very rare disease in humans.
What are the symptoms?
• People who contract cutaneous anthrax develop dark coloured, painless lesions within 3 to 10 days (usually between 5 and 7 days) of exposure. These lesions can be associated with swelling of the surrounding tissue. Even without treatment, four out of five people with cutaneous anthrax survive. With treatment, patients generally make a full recovery.
• People who contract intestinal anthrax develop abdominal pain and fever between 3 and 7 days after exposure, and typically death follows soon after.
• People who contract anthrax by inhalation may first have flu-like symptoms. Over several days, the disease can progress with severe breathing difficulties and shock. Inhalational anthrax has a 60-90% fatality rate. The incubation period for inhalational anthrax is most frequently between 1 and 5 days but may be as long as 60 days.
How is it spread?
• In approximately 95% of cases of anthrax, the bacteria gain entrance through broken skin or wounds (which can cause cutaneous anthrax) from a source such as the carcass of an infected animal.
• Anthrax bacteria can also be ingested in poorly prepared meat from infected animals (which can cause intestinal anthrax) or breathed in (which can cause inhalational or pulmonary anthrax 
How is it prevented?
• Anyone who handles material potentially contaminated with anthrax should wear gloves, overalls and rubber boots, and ensure that skin breaks are protected with sealed waterproof dressings.
• All contaminated items and clothing should be stored in labelled double plastic bags until exposure to anthrax is excluded. If anthrax is confirmed, all contaminated items need to be either incinerated or sterilized at 121°C for 30 minutes.
• Thorough hand washing and showering with soap are also a very important protection against infection.
• In some cases where a person has had significant exposure to anthrax spores, antibiotics may help prevent infection.
• A vaccine is available to people who have an ongoing risk of exposure, such as workers handling infected animals or animal products. However, immunisation is not recommended for the general population due to the extremely low risk of infection.
How is it diagnosed?
• Confirmation requires isolation of anthrax bacteria from the blood, skin lesions or respiratory secretions of patients.
• Cutaneous anthrax can be suspected based on the appearance of the ulcer.
How is it treated?
Several antibiotics, including penicillin, doxycycline and ciprofloxacin, can be used to treat anthrax infections.
What is the public health response?
• Laboratories must notify the local public health unit of any suspected or confirmed anthrax cases.
• Public health unit staff will investigate all cases to find out how the infection occurred, identify other people at risk of infection, implement control measures and provide other advice.
For more information please contact your doctor, local public health unit or community health centre. Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 show reports of communicable diseases received through to the end of April 2008 in NSW.
Measles continues to circulate in NSW
Three confirmed cases of measles were notified during March in the Sydney area. One case of measles was confirmed in a partially immunised female aged in her twenties who had recently returned from England. An unimmunised contact who received Normal Human Immunoglobulin (NHIG) on day 7 post-exposure subsequently developed symptoms of sore throat, cough, coryza, fever and rash, and was confirmed with measles. A male aged in his forties, who recently returned from travel to Japan, was also confirmed with measles in March.
During April, a further seven cases of measles were confirmed in young adults ranging in age from 16 to 28 years, bringing the total number of cases to 20 in NSW this year. One of these cases was an international student from an English language college in Sydney. Three cases were subsequently linked to this case: a household contact; a staff member from the college; and a student from the college, all aged in their 20s.
In response to these cases, public health units across 
Enterics disease
In March, NSW public health units investigated 14 outbreaks of gastroenteritis including 10 suspected to be caused by person-to-person spread and four suspected to be foodborne.
Of the suspected person-to-person outbreaks, six were reported from aged care facilities where 81 people were affected. Four outbreaks were reported from childcare centres where 27 people were affected. All were suspected to be caused by viral infections, although norovirus was confirmed in only one outbreak that was in an aged care facility.
The four outbreaks that were suspected to be foodborne, affected 101 people (ranging from seven to 50 people per outbreak). In the largest outbreak, 50 of approximately 100 people residing in an institutional setting were ill with symptoms, including vomiting and diarrhoea. Clostridium perfringens toxin was identified in stool specimens from three ill patients. Epidemiological evidence suggested that a curry meal was the likely vehicle for infection. In another outbreak, Salmonella bacteria were identified in some of the stools of 14 people who were ill after eating a common meal. The epidemiological investigation suggested that a dessert that had included raw eggs was the likely vehicle. The cause of the remaining two outbreaks remains unclear.
In April, NSW public health units investigated 20 outbreaks of gastroenteritis including 16 where person-toperson spread was implicated, two suspected to be foodborne and two suspected to be related to an environmental exposure. The NSW Food Authority inspected commercial premises associated with these outbreaks.
The 16 outbreaks where person-to-person spread was suspected affected a total of 178 people. Eight occurred in child care centres and affected 82 people, seven occurred in aged care facilities and affected 90 people, and one occurred in a hospital and affected six people. Clinical specimens were submitted for testing from six of 13 suspected person-to-person gastroenteritis outbreaks. Rota virus was confirmed in stool samples from one aged care facility outbreak, and in another both rotavirus and Norovirus were identified in stool samples. The causative agent was not confirmed for the remaining outbreaks.
Of the two suspected foodborne gastroenteritis outbreaks, one was a small cluster of three cases of Salmonella
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Communicable Diseases Branch, NSW Department of Health Typhimurium infection. All cases reported eating takeaway salad that contained mayonnaise dressing made from raw egg (a known risk factor for salmonellosis).
One of the suspected environmental exposure outbreaks was due to Shiga toxigenic Escherichia coli (STEC) O26 among a group of 250 Japanese students who were visiting Sydney during part of the incubation period for their illness. In total, 75 students (including 39 asymptomatic students) tested positive for STEC O26 after they returned home to Japan. STEC is carried by animals, such as cattle.
People are infected when they come into contact with the faeces of an infected animal or person, either directly or indirectly. STEC is spread through consuming contaminated food (e.g. undercooked burgers, unwashed salad vegetables and unpasteurised milk or milk products), drinking or swimming in contaminated water, person-toperson contact (e.g. contact with faeces of an infected person) and contact with animals on farms or petting zoos.
The students had visited a wildlife park and eaten at several restaurants. Despite an investigation, the source of infection, whether in Australia or Japan, remains unclear.
An outbreak of Salmonella Bioser Java that is clustered around the Northern Beaches area, and suspected to be due to an environmental exposure, is currently under investigation. 
